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RISK OBJECTIVISM AND RISK
SUBJECTIVISM: WHEN ARE RISKS

REAL?
Paul B.Thompson*
Introduction
In introducing a session on "The Risks We Run and the Risks We

Accept," at a 1979 conference of risk analysts, Chauncey Starr
characterized the risk judgments of the great mass of citizens in the
following way:1
Their perceptions may be so far from reality that you and I

know that they're absurd, but that's how they feel about it
and that's the way they perceive things. So, in discussing
the subject [of risk], we really have to distinguish between

the reality of what may or may not occur, the analysis of it,
*

Professor Thompson received his B.A. from Emory University (1974) and his

M.A. (1979) and Ph.D. (1980) both from State University of New York at Stony
Brook. He is Associate Professor of Philosophy and Agricultural Economics at
Texas A&M University.
1
C. Starr, Introductory Remarks in SOCIETAL RISK ASSESSMENT: HOW
SAFE IS SAFE ENOUGH? 4 (R. C. Schwing and W. A. Albers eds. 1980). In the
same volume, W. W. Lowrance essentially rejects Starr's formulation of the problem
by characterizing analysis as a form of perception that differs from the laypersons
primarily in being "subjectively endorsed by the scientific community" in The
Nature of Risk, at 6-7. Lowrance's approach converts Starr's concern for getting
clear about real risk into a public policy issue regarding the political authority of
scientists, rather than a philosophical and methodological problem about the nature
of risk. This strategy for thinking about the policy problem is pursued in W. W.
LOWRANCE, SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND PUBLIC POLICY (1986) and by
Raynor and Cantor, How Fair Is Safe Enough?: The Cultural Approach to
Technology Choice, 7 RISK ANALYSIS 3 (1987). A more cynical statement of the
view is found at Tieman, Risk, Technology and Society, 7 RISK ANALYSIS 11
(1987). This contrasting view cannot be profitably pursued in the present context
without rather elaborately complicating matters that are already complex.
I RISK -Issues in Health &Safety 3 [Winter 1990]

and our perception of it.
Starr's opinion was (and is, I think) widely shared by risk analysts,
and others who hope that risk assessment can fulfill its initial promise to
provide objective, scientific information on a wide range of social and
technological risks. There is a bit more to the view than "providing
information," however, for in these casually worded comments, Starr
presumes a concept of risk that challenges traditional approaches in law
and public policy.
A recent article 2 documents the shift from traditional risk concepts
to probabilistic concepts in the law. The traditional approach has been
to use the judgment of the reasonable person as the paradigm for
identifying risk. If a reasonable person would have judged an act to be
risky, it was risky, even if harm did not materialize as a result. Drunken
driving and reckless endangerment, for example, are violations of law,
even in the absence of actual harm. Conversely, there are unforeseeable
harms that can be caused by even the most unexceptional acts walking down stairs or boiling peas on the stove. If these activities are
to be regarded as part and parcel of the normal activities of a reasonable
person, then there will be no basis for a finding of responsibility
(exceptions abound, I am aware) for the oddball, unfortunate outcomes
that do occur.3 The probabilistic approach to risk takes it that risk is
an omnipresent, mathematically measurable possibility of harm that
applies to natural events as well as human actions. Because the
probabilistic concept identifies risk by measuring the probability and
value of events, rather than by examining analogies to paradigm cases,
risk can be seen as reality that yields its secrets to scientific enquiry. 4
2
3

Schroeder, Rights Against Risk, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 495 (1986)
J.J. THOMSON, RIGHTS, RESTITUTION AND RISK, 225-250 (1986); P.

Thompson, Collective Action and the Analysis of Risk, 1(2) PUBLIC AFFAIRS Q.
23 (1987).
4
See Starr, Rudman and Whipple, Philosophical Basisfor Risk Analysis,
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A key application of this view is in law and regulatory policy, where the
new probabilistic concept can be used to supplant more traditional
5
concepts.
Starr's distinctions between reality and perception have implications
for law and policy because the probabilistic concept of risk provides a
new basis for identifying and assessing risk. Traditionally, the principal
criterion for the riskiness of an action has been the judgment of a
archetypal "reasonable person," but it is precisely the judgment of the
typical person that Starr wants to set aside as mere perception. Real risk
is analyzed by science; perceived risk is the opinion and judgment of the
common man. The new view substitutes the analytic of science for the
fallible judgment of the ordinary mortal; but the ordinary mortal and the
reasonable person are one and the same. The new view makes the
explicit claim that scientific research provides a superior basis for
reliable prediction than does the uninformed judgment of the reasonable
person, but it also makes the implicit claim that rigorous interpretation of
probability theory yields a superior conceptual framework for
understanding risk issues. While the first of these claims is surely true,
the second is not. Rejecting this second claim does not, however,
entail that probabilistic data should never be used in the regulation of
technological hazards, nor that people who have a good grasp of
probabilities and statistics are never equipped to make better decisions
on risks than people of comparable intelligence who lack such
knowledge. It is the case, on the other hand, that the way such
knowledge is to be applied to the analysis and management of risk is a
1976 ANN. REV. ENERGY 1; E. P. O'DONNELL, A PROPOSED APPROACH TO THE
ESTABLISHMENT AND USE OF QUANITrAT[VE SAFETY GOALS INTHE NUCLEAR
REGULATORY PROCESS (The Atomic Industrial Forum, Comm. Reactor Licensing
and Safety 1981).
5
See Schroeder, supra note 2; Mayo, Increasing Public Participationin

Controversies Involving Hazards: The Value of MetastatisticalRules, 10(4)
Science Tech. Hum. Values 54 (1985).
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matter of more subtly than is often thought. This conclusion is related
to work that takes risk to socially constructed rather than "real" in any
robust sense,6 but that is far ahead of the subject at hand.
The Reality of What May or May Not Occur
The parlance of "real" or "actual" risk is often employed in one of
three problem contexts. First, it is useful in explaining how the physical
and biological sciences are brought to bear upon problems of risk.7

These sciences study the world as it is. If they are to study risk, the
focus will be upon "the reality of what may or may not occur." Second,
once the role of the natural and engineering sciences has been
established, it may be useful to make a methodological distinction
between physical and biological sciences, on the one hand, and the
6

Risk analysis as Starr and others have defined it, takes events to be the object

of inquiry; one has an analysis of risk when one identifies a class of potentially
harmful events and makes an assessment of their probability, relative to some item
of interest. In taking risk to be an act sortal, risk is less a discoverable property of
events than a concept for sorting acts into categories that may be of cultural origin
and have oblique purposes (when, indeed, they have any purpose at all). Mary
Douglas has, at times, seemed to advocate such a view; M. DOUGLAS AND A.
WILDAVSKY, RISK AND CULTURE (1982). I have discussed it in Collective Action
and the Analysis of Risk, supra note 3. See also Lowrance, 1980; and Raynor and
Cantor, 1987, both supranote 1.
7
Risk analysis emerged in the decade of the 1970's as a multidisciplinary
enquiry that employed engineering and natural science methodologies in the service of
measuring, predicting, and managing a large class of events that were presumed to
have physical and biological causes as their basis. The natural science basis of these
techniques distinguished them from actuarial, economic or financial risk analysis.
The positivist bent of the physical, biological, and engineering scientists who were
pioneering this new field led them to think of themselves as studying reality, and to
think of the old actuarial risk analysts as studying some nonnatural phenomenon.
Starr, Rudman and Whipple, 1976 supra note 4, at 640-642, use the term "real risk"
in just this way. More typical is W. D. ROWE, AN ANATOMY OF RISK (1977),
who lays out the framework for natural science enquiry into the probability of
unwanted consequences as the main task of risk analysis but does not use the terms
"real" or "actual." Rowe's general framework is carried into more recent discussions
by Wilson and Crouch, Risk Assessment and Comparison: An Introduction, 236
SCIENCE 267 (1987).
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social sciences (including law and philosophy), on the other. In Starr's
quote the word "analysis" refers back to "the reality of may or may not
occur." Risk analysis is the analysis of a reality. Social science will be
useful, of course, because we also need to understand the perception of
risk. We need to understand perception, however, not because it gives
us any insight into the reality of risk, but because that reality may be, as
Starr intimates, rather unrelated to how people behave. Real risk is the
object of natural science inquiry; perceived risk is the object of social
science inquiry.
There is a third use of the expression "real risk" that, at first glance,
appears to be unrelated to the previous two. We use the word "real" to
express norms. Real risks are the risks we ought to pay attention to, as
opposed to imaginary or hysterical risks. We want the real thing, and
we want it as real as it gets. So, often to identify something as "real" is
to make a prescription: this is the item on which judgment should be
based, on which action should be taken. In fact, this normative sense of
"real risk" is generally related to the previous two, and it is clearly
implied by Starr's remark. The view he has expressed is that the natural
scientist's analysis of risk ought to be the authoritative basis for
regulatory decision making.8 It ought to be authoritative because it is
the one that addresses reality, rather than perception. Let reality be our
8 The Starr quote is typical of this view in that perceived risk is roughly equated
with unscientific, hence poorly informed, attitudes held by members of the general
public. Risk analysts recognize that these perceptions are likely to be widely shared,
and that they influence policy in a wide range of cases, but many would also insist
that such policy choices be made in full cognizance of the "unreality" of public

beliefs. See Starr, Rudman, and Whipple supra note 4; Starr and Whipple, The
Risks of Risk Decision, 208 SCIENCE 1114 (1980); and Ruckleshaus Science,
Risk and Public Policy, 221 SCIENCE 1026 (1983). Ruckleshaus modified his
views somewhat in Risk in a Free Society, 4 RISK ANALYSIS 157 (1984). The
issue leads naturally to the discussion of "risk communication," conceived as a
dialogue between perception and reality. See Otway, Experts, Risk
Communicationand Democracy,7 RISK ANALYSIS 125 (1987).
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guide. Now, one might be suspicious of the way that Starr has so
concisely and unpretentiously collapsed descriptive and normative
senses of the word "real," but perhaps it comes down to little more than
saying that we are obligated to act upon the true facts, so far as we can
tell what they are. This is surely an unexceptionable assumption, as far
as it goes, and I will not question it. It is a somewhat different
presumption that creates the mischief, one having to do with the way
that the true facts are distinguished from other factors. For our
purposes, this distinction appears in the further assumption that risk
management can be divided into an assessment phase, in which real or
actual risk is the object of analysis, and an acceptance phase in which
perceived risks are accommodated through the political process. On at
least one version of this view, assessment is entirely a matter of
assembling and quantifying facts, while acceptance involves the
application of values and decision rules to the technically derived factual
picture of what the real risk is. Studies of perceived risk are thought to
provide insight into the values and preferences that might be employed
in making a judgment of acceptability, but neither studies nor the
perceptions themselves figure in identifying the real risk itself.9 In
this classically positivist account of the philosophy of natural science,
real risk is a matter of how things stand in the world, while perceptions
are reactions to the world, affecting reality only indirectly in virtue of
their influence on human action. If this view is to be of any help in
regulatory policy, the difference between the scientific risk analysts'
view of "how things stand in the world" and the reasonable person's
view must consist simply in the scientist having a more accurate account
9 See, e.g., Rowe, supra note 7 at 28-43. See also Otway, Linnerooth, and
Niehaus, On the Social Aspects of Risk Assessment, in RELIABILITY

ENGINEERING AND RISK ASSESSMENT (J. B. Fussell and G. R. Burdick, eds.

1977); and Firebaugh, Public Attitudes and Information on the Nuclear Option,
22(2) NUCLEAR SAFETY, 147 (1981). Former Environmental Protection Agency
Administrator William Ruckleshaus committed himself explicitly to this view in
1983; see supra note 8.
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of the facts. If there are conceptual differences in their view as well, it
is not at all clear that the "values" of the reasonable person can be
unambiguously applied to the "facts" of the scientific risk analyst.
Characterizing the Problem
The philosophical problem might be pursued from one of two starting
points: we might begin by asking whether a metaphysical theory of risk
is possible, 10 or we might try to get clear about some prototypical
cases for calling a risk "real," and then see whether there is a
philosophically defensible concept that matches them in a satisfactory
way. It is the second approach that promises to get at the main problem
most directly, and it is this virtue that recommends it here. We begin by
considering some test cases.
Consider two stories, two fictional cases, if you will, about the
possibility of a rattlesnake residing in your mailbox. The first story is
recounted to you by the seven year old boy who lives in the house next
door. He tells you that a voodoo priest has put a spell on your house
and that it may have caused the letters put in your box to be transformed
into an angry rattlesnake. The second story is recounted to you by the
rational adult who lives in the house next door. She tells you that
vandals have been up to a particularly odious form of mischief, stuffing
live rattlers into neighborhood mailboxes, two having been found so
far. Now consider the question: Is it risky to open the mailbox in your
usual fashion? The first story about the voodoo priest is entirely
incredible, and if that is prelude to the question, the answer would seem
to be "No." The second story, however, is quite credible, and if it is
this one that precedes the question, the answer would appear to be
"Yes." There is, thus, something about the relationship between the
10 N. RESCHER, RISK. A PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION TO RISK ANALYSIS
(1983); cf. P. Thompson, The Philosophical Foundationsof Risk, 24 SOUTHERN
J. PHILOSOPHY 273 (1986).
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credibility of our information and our willingness to judge an otherwise
unexceptional act "risky."
One fairly common sense way to put the problem is to say that in the
credible case there really is a risk of being bitten by rattlesnake, while in
the incredible case there is not. Accordingly, the problem of separating
these two stories can be understood as instance of the general question,
"When are risks real?" The general question, of course, is the one we
want to answer; so we want to set aside anything peculiar to our cases.
Our seven year old neighbor probably does not expect you to believe his
story (indeed, probably doesn't believe it himself), so there is a sense in
which no one is expected to think that there really is a risk in the
incredible case. Replace the seven year old with a deadly serious
paranoid schizophrenic and that fact changes; we think there very will
might be a snake in the mailbox. We are no more willing to credit the
story about a voodoo priest, however. The judgment that the alleged
risk in the incredible case is not a real one does not, therefore, depend
only upon the sincerity of the informant. If we take the "deluded
person" case as a third one, we might tend to think that there is a real
risk in opening the mailbox because we have general beliefs about the
behavior of such people, and clear and present evidence that the person
before us is likely to be providing a deceitful account of a genuine
danger.
Do these simple, nontechnical cases capture the main philosophical
elements? The sheer simplicity of the cases should not be a problem,
for they could be trumped up so that it is not rattlesnakes and mailboxes
that concern us, but events inside the core of a nuclear reactor. Our
neighbors could be experts, activists, or power company executives.
Sorting out stories about voodoo priests and ascertaining the motives of
our strange neighbors may be easier than sorting out the testimony of
experts and divining the motives of scientists and executives who have
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great personal stake in the technology at hand. In many important
respects these issues seem to be quite the same.
A Baseline for the Reality of Risk
Our question, then is, "When are risks real?" Although we do not
as yet have philosophical criteria for answering this question in a general
way, our three rattlesnake cases can serve as paradigms in which
common sense would have little difficulty establishing the reality of the
risk in each particular instance. As noted above, the growth of risk
analysis capability corresponds to a growing willingness to give a
probabilistic answer to the general question, but before examining how
probabilistic answers measure up to the paradigm cases, it will be useful
to propose nonprobabilistic criteria that will serve as a baseline for
deciding when risks are real.
Each of the three rattlesnake cases purports to provide some sort of
story that explains how a rattlesnake might have come to be in a
mailbox. Each of the three cases either describes or suggests a
sufficient cause for there being a rattlesnake in the box. What is missing
from the first case, the seven year old who reports a voodoo spell, that
is present in the other two? The alleged causal mechanism, a magical
spell, is at odds with the standard repertoire of causal forces that
rational, informed adults take to be capable of producing events in the
world. The second case indicates the cause, vandals placing the snake
in the box, directly; the third case indicates a cause, a schizophrenic
acting irrationally and placing a snake in the box, indirectly. Both of the
indicated causal sequences are consistent with patterns of cause and
effect that rational adults recognize, and, indeed, are the causal
sequences that would be regarded as explaining the presence of the
snake, should it subsequently be discovered in the box. Even if a snake
were found in the box following the seven year old's testimony, the idea
I RISK-Issues in Health &Safety 3 [Winter 19901

of a magic spell would not be accepted as the cause of the snake's being
found. Since the alleged cause would be rejected as a true cause, even
when the snake is found, it is not taken as grounds for thinking that
there is a risk of finding the snake in the ex ante case. The general
answer to the question, "When are risks real?" is that risks are real when
there is sufficient reason to suspect the presence of a causal sequence
-that would produce the unwanted event. I shall call this answer the
causal answer, and shall contrast it to two probabilistic answers
below.
The causal answer to the question of when risks are real has a
number of advantages. First, it has prima facie plausibility, and is
highly adaptable to a large variety of cases. It provides a test that is
capable of eliminating a large number of hysterical or capricious
allegations of risk. When legal persons commit acts that initiate a causal
sequence indicating risk, the causal answer provides grounds for
identifying parties that may be held responsible for damages when
unwanted events materialize. The causal answer is nontechnical and can
be understood, at least on the face of it, by any competent adult. The
causal answer is also open ended in that initial causal judgments may
suggest why additional information concerning the likelihood of specific
sequences resulting in harmful events is desirable on a case by case
basis.
At the same time, it must be admitted that there are enormous
problems with the causal answer. Relying as it does upon a common
sense repertoire of causal mechanisms, it is subject to multiple
interpretations. There are, of course, people in the world who do
recognize black magic as a legitimate form of causation, and people who
do not recognize the efficacy of mental illness. The causal answer in
itself does very little to help us distinguish between causal sequences
that are possible but unlikely and casual sequences that suggest a real
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and present danger. The causal answer is hardly the last word in
identifying a risk, but it is not intended as such. The causal answer is a
first order sorting device, at best: it supports the judgment that a risk is
real, but does little to indicate the relative seriousness of equally real
risks.
What is more, the concept of causality is itself notoriously
difficult. 11 The law has standards for determining causality that are
quite different from those of science. The criterion given by the causal
answer is more consistent with a legal tradition that establishes cause by
reference to the judgment of a reasonable person. On the other hand, if
causality is nothing more than "constant conjunction," as Hume
thought, perhaps we would do better to replace the concept with a
notion of statistical correlation. 12 Analysis of this question opens
immediately into some of the most difficult issues in the interface
between science and the law. The gist of Chauncey Starr's suggestion,
as it applies to law and public policy, is that we should replace the
causal answer with a probabilistic one, just as science has (perhaps)
replaced the notion of causality with more precise concepts derived from
logic and mathematics.
Risk Objectivism and Risk Subjectivism
In keeping with the spirit of Starr's remarks, then, a more precise
answer to the question, "When are risks real?" would say that they are
real when there is a measurable probability of harm. This answer
divides immediately into two, because there are two schools of thought
on what probability means. 13 Objectivists use the idea of relative
11 Davis, ProbabilisticTheoriesof Causation,in PROBABILITY AND CAUSALITY

(J.Fetzer, ed. 1988); W. SALMON, SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION AND THE CAUSAL
STRUCTURE OF THE WORLD (1984); D. DAVIDSON, ESSAYS ON ACTIONS AND

EVENTS (1980); J. L. MACKIE, THE CEMENT OF THE UNIVERSE (1974); and D.
HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE (1739 - reprinted 1980).
12 W. SALMON, STATISTICAL EXPLANATION AND STATISTICAL RELEVANCE
(1971).
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frequency to define probability, while subjectivists use the idea of
confidence. 14 Ian Hacking has recently called the debate between these
schools a sterile one, ignored by those who actually are in the business
of measuring probabilities, 15 so the entire debate may be regarded with

skepticism. Nevertheless, the two rival accounts of probability provide
13 P. Hurley offers a simple textbook account of these views in A CONCISE
INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC 405-418 (2nd Ed., 1985). More extended theoretical
discussions include W. Kneale, Probability and Induction (1949); R. Carnap, Logical
Foundations of Probability (1950); W. Salmon, The Foundations of Scientific
Inference (1967); and I. Hacking, The Emergence of Probability (1975). The
following authors defend objectivist views: R. von Mises, WAHRSHEINLICHKEIT,
STATISTIK UND WAHRHErT (1928 - translated by H. Geiringer as PROBABILITY,

STATISTICS AND TRUTH 1951); Popper, The Propensity Interpretation of
Probability, 10 BRITISH J. PHILOSOPHY SCIENCE 25 (1959); C. HEMPEL,
ASPECTS OF SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION 376-411 (1965); and C. GLYMOUR,
THEORY AND EVIDENCE 85-93 (1980). Many of the important papers on
subjectivism are collected in STUDIES IN SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITY (H. Kyburg
and H. Smokier eds. 1964), but see also D. V. LINDLEY, INTRODUCTION TO
PROBABILITY AND STATISTICS FROM A BAYESIAN VIEWPOINT (1965); B. de
FINEITI, THEORY OF PROBABILITY (1974); P. HORWICH, PROBABILITY AND
EVIDENCE (1982); R. JEFFREY, THE LOGIC OF DECISION (1983); and Papineau,
Probabilitiesand Causes,82 J. PHILOSOPHY 57 (1985).
14 This characterization oversimplifies the distinction, which is really a three way
distinction, at least, and perhaps a four way one. The classical theory does not derive
probabilities by observing relative frequencies, but is usually counted "objective."
Bayesian probability is usually equated with subjectivism, but R. Rozenkrantz,
argues for objective Bayesianism in INFERENCE, METHOD AND DECISION (1977).
See, e.g., R. MILLER, FACT AND METHOD 267-345 (1986). Empirical risk
estimation is far more sensitive to constraints on data collection than to the
philosophical role of probability in confirming scientific theories, making it
somewhat difficult to assess the relevance of philosophical sources cited here and
supra at note 11. Quantitative risk analysts would probably be satisfied with the
oversimplified alternatives given here: see, e.g., Parry and Winter, Characterization
and Evaluation of Uncertainty in ProbabilisticRisk Analysis, 22 NUCLEAR
SAFETY 28 (1981); Abramson, Some Misconceptions About the Foundations of
Risk Analysis, 1 RISK ANALYSIS 229-230 (1981); and Kaplan and Garrick, Some
Misconceptions About Misconceptions: A Response to Abramson, 1 RISK
ANALYSIS 230-233 (1981).
15 Hacking, Culpable Ignoranceof InterferenceEffects, in VALUES AT RISK 141
(D. MacLean, ed. 1986).
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the risk analyst with two different ways to redefine the causal answer,
each of which goes to the foundations of scientific method. I shall,
accordingly, discuss risk objectivism as the view that risk is a function
of relative frequency (as well as other variables, of course), and risk
subjectivism as the view that risk is a function of confidence (same
qualification).
Risk objectivism
In many respects, the chance of pulling a rattlesnake out of a
mailbox looks a lot like the chance of pulling a particular lottery ticket
out of a vat. My odds of winning the lottery can be specified objectively
as the ratio of the number of tickets I am holding to the total number of
tickets sold. If I am holding ten tickets and only one hundred have been
sold, my odds are one in ten. Why not say, by analogy, that the risk of
pulling a snake from my mailbox is a ratio of the number of snake filled
mailboxes to the total number of mailboxes? If there are fifty million
mailboxes in the country, and five of them have snakes inside, my odds
of pulling a snake from this one would be one in ten million. 16 There
are some data collection problems both in knowing how many
mailboxes there really are, and in knowing how many house snakes
short of actually opening all fifty million of them to see. 17 These
16 Many statements of risk analysis methods have assumed without argument that
risk identification will proceed by collecting relative frequency data. In addition to
sources cited supra at note 3, see NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION,
REACTOR SAFETY STUDY - AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCIDENT RISKS IN U. S.
COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS, REPORT WASH-1400 (1975);
NUCLEAR SYSTEMS RELIABILITY ENGINEERING AND RISK ASSESSMENT (J. B.
Fussell and G. R. Burdick, eds. 1977); H. W. LEWIS ET. AL., RISK ASSESSMENT
REVIEW GROUP REPORT TO THE U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION,
NRC REPORT NUREG/CR-0400 (1978); and Lewis, The Safety of Fission

Reactors,242(3) Scientific American 53-65 (1980).
17 Lewis, 1978, supra note 16. Many antinuclear activists seized upon this point

in rejecting the rosy predictions published in the Rasmussen report (WASH-1400,
supranote 16). Few (if any) advocated a subjectivist view in response. For antiI RISK - Issues in Health&Safety 3 [Winter 19901

problems have led some risk analysts to reject objectivism in favor the
subjectivist view described below, 18 but they are not, in themselves,
decisive objections to objectivism as an answer to the question, "When
are risks real?" We have captured the reality of a risk when we have
given the conditional probability, measured by relative frequencies, that
the unwanted event occurs, relative to the given evidence. Stated more
intuitively, our description of risk converges with reality when the
events of concern (the snake in the mailbox) are described relative to all
events of the general type (opening the mailbox). We may have
practical difficulties in collecting the data needed to make our judgment
converge with reality, but it is, at least, clear what the target is. The
objective description of snakes in mailboxes is, thus, quite like the
description of ticket stubs in a rotating vat.
The objectivist view eliminates reference to causes entirely, but does
so at some cost to conceptual clarity. It seems to make the answer to
our question "When are risks real?" the same in every case, even the
incredible one. There is, after all some chance that a snake might be in
the mailbox anytime you reach inside. There are, thus, no cases in
which risk is not real. The risk objectivist has thus told us less than we
knew (or, at least, thought we knew) in the first place. The damage
may not be total, however. The relative frequency view requires three
conditional probabilities to assess risk, each ranging over a different
population of mailboxes. First, we want the number of actual snakes
appearing in mailboxes incredibly described by unreliable seven year old
nuclear critics committed to the objectivist view, see Holdren, The nuclear
controversy and the limitationsof decision making by experts, 32 BULL. ATOMIC
SCIENTISTS 20-22 (1976); A. LOVINS AND J. H. PRICE, NON-NUCLEAR

FUTURES (1975); and Levi, Assessing Accident Risks in U.S. CommercialNuclear
Power: Scientific Method and the Rasmussen Report, 1980 SOCIAL RESEARCH
395-408.
18 Apostolakis, Probability and Risk Assessment: The Subjectivist Viewpoint
and Some Suggestions, 19 NUCLEAR SAFETY 302-315 (1978); Parry and Winter,
1981 supranote 14.
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children. Second, we want the number of actual snakes appearing in
mailboxes credibly described by reliable adults. Third, we want the
number of actual snakes inside mailboxes described in any fashion by
suspiciously acting paranoid schizophrenics. Although there is, in
principle (at least), a real risk in each case, it is reasonable to think that
the conditional probability will be far higher in the credible case, and
significantly higher in the third than in the first. Maybe this is all that is
meant by "real risk."
Let us, again, set aside the practical problems of data collection
(which have now been made even more intractable). Two problems
remain. The first is that some of the important questions have been
begged in determining which conditional probabilities to assess. The
intuitive judgments about causes have not really been eliminated in the
objectivist view; they are now just being built into the way that we
define the conditions for assessing relative frequency. It is tempting to
imagine that a scientist can, in the ideal case, observe and record all
facts, then identify those correlations among facts having statistical
significance strictly on the basis of mathematical and logical axioms.
Were this ideal a tenable picture of scientific method, the reality of a risk
might be given by the correlation of unwanted events to ex ante
predictors. But such an ideal is so far from tenable as to be filled with
absurdities too numerous to mention. 19 The point can be made,
perhaps, by noting that if statistical studies confirmed our presumptive
judgments of the relative reality of risk in our rattlesnake cases, it would
almost certainly be the end of discussion. If per impossible, however,
a statistical analysis of alleged instances of magic spells showed them to
be highly correlated to the finding of snakes, the discussion would only
be beginning. We would be less inclined to think that there really are
19 C. G. HEMPEL, PHILOSOPHY OF NATURAL SCIENCE (1966) discusses these
problems at 11-18.
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risks when such magic spells are reported than that some hitherto
unsuspected causal mechanism (perhaps devotees of the shaman) is at
work. Relative frequencies provide some confirmation for our initial
causal judgments, but it is not at all clear that they provide a conceptual
replacement for them.
The second problem is a special case of the first. Relative
frequencies require repeatable test situations in order to become
meaningful, but causal sequences may exist only in a single case.
Indeed, the causal sequences that are of interest in legal hearings are
often unique. The reasonable person has little difficulty in assigning
causal efficacy to such sequences, but events such as "reports of
vandals putting snakes in mailboxes," or "schizophrenics putting snakes
in mailboxes," may not be repeated frequently enough to have statistical
significance, even in the ideal case when "all the facts have been
collected." There thus seems little warrant for replacing causal
statements in risk descriptions with statements of conditional
probabilities measured by relative frequencies. The relationship
between our common sense notions of cause and risk, on the one hand,
and statistically measured relative frequencies, on the other, is far more
subtle than those who would have us define risk in terms of probability
and consequence have recognized.
Risk subjectivism
The Bayesian or subjectivist view of probability has become
attractive partly because it speaks to a host of the problems, both
conceptual and practical, raised by the objectivist view. 2 0 In the
interest of brevity, these advantages of the subjectivist view will be
omitted here. A subjectivist will say many of things that have already
been said about our rattlesnake cases, including the idea that risk can be
20 Apostolakis, supra note 18 and Parry and Winter, supra note 14, remark on
practical problems; Miller supra note 14 discusses conceptual advantages.
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defined in terms of the conditional probabilities of unwanted events.
For the subjectivist, our willingness to credit the evidence of our rational
neighbor, and to discredit the evidence of the seven year old is a best
expressed as a level of confidence in the prediction (e.g. that there is a
snake in the mailbox) that each account implies. The level of confidence
must be bound by time and information, for our confidence in any
prediction changes over time and as we acquire more information. We
may say, for example, that we think it will rain tomorrow (hence it
would be risky to plan a picnic), but our confidence in this prediction
will likely shrink or grow after hearing a weather report. The
subjectivist will tell us that what we have (perhaps naively) described as
a worry about the reality of risk is better described as a quandary about
when we should have confidence in any claim indicating or alleging the
existence of risk. In analyzing a simpler rattlesnake in a mailbox case,
S. Kaplan and B. J. Garrick begin by noting that whether reaching into
the mailbox is risky does not depend upon whether there really is a
rattlesnake in it; it depends, instead, upon what we know (or believe)
about the mailbox at the time we prepare to open it. For an observer
who knows there is a snake in the box, opening the box is very risky;
21
for one who does have this information, the risk may be quite low.
Now, the subjectivist view appears to be vulnerable to a trivial
objection, namely, that it makes risk entirely a matter personal reactions
rather than scientific enquiry. It seems we can just choose the stories
in which to place our confidence, and while you may prefer stories
about neighborhood vandals, I may prefer stories about voodoo priests.
The subjectivist response is that this is right as far as starting points are
concerned, but that the person who fails to revise beliefs based on
experience is just irrational. Bayes theorem, the heart of subjectivist
theory, tells us how to revise our beliefs, and how to adjust the
21 Kaplan and Garrick, On the Quantitative Definition of Risk, 1 RISK
ANALYSIS 11-27 (1981).

I RISK- Issues in Health &Safety 3 [Winter 19901

confidence we place in them. Failure to learn in a manner roughly
consistent with Bayes theorem can only be attributed to unjustifiable
biases or inexplicable confidence in beliefs that consistently turn out to
mislead us. 2 2 This emphasis upon learning and the success of our
beliefs, thus, turns out to explain pretty well why we should reject the
story of the voodoo priest, but should be willing to accept the story
about vandals. Two Bayesian decision makers given the same
information will always arrive at the same level of confidence. If I am
willing to credit the voodoo priest and you are not, it is simply because
one of us has more (or different) information than the other.
This talk about learning requires one to state the objection to
subjectivism in more precise terms. A key is in how Kaplan and
Garrick themselves describe the rattlesnake case. They seem
comfortable in saying that there is a risk here only if I have reason to
believe that there is a snake inside. The snake is either in the box or it is
not, the problem of risk arises only in conjunction with information
about which state of affairs obtains.2 3 Having opened the box many
times and found nothing more sinister than an audit notice from the IRS,
there is (for you) no significant risk of there being a snake. For me,
having heard the neighbor's story, the risk is real. This, however, just
seems wrong. Part of the motivation for positing a notion of real risk,
distinct from perception, is to describe the situation in which we run
risks of which we are unaware, even, perhaps, could not have been
aware.
The problem is not that any strongly felt estimate of risk is valid, but
that the Bayesian decision maker's estimate of risk can never be wrong.
22 Research in cognitive psychology reveals that everyone fails to learn in the
Bayesian way, but it is far from clear what to make of this fact. See D.
KAHNEMAN, P. SLOVIC, AND A. TVERSKY, JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY:

HEURISTICS AND BIASES (1982).
23 Kaplan and Garrick, 1981 supra note 21.
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Learning is just the addition of more information. New information
may require revision of our beliefs, but it cannot invalidate the judgment
made on the prior, more limited, information. Aside from the failure to
apply Bayesian rules of inference, there can be no possibility of error in
the subjectivist account of risk. There is no way to say that someone
ought to have known, ought to have thought of, or was culpably
ignorant. Contrary to this result, an important proportion of our
concern about risk arises from the possibility of events to which we
cannot assign meaningful probabilities, and of which we may be
culpably ignorant. 24 The subjectivist account defines risk only in the
ex ante perspective; it does not tell us what risks we should have been
aware of, ex post.
What Have We Learned?
The objectivist view makes it too hard for us to be right in making a
risk judgment, while the subjectivist view makes it too hard for us to be
wrong. While frequencies are clearly relevant to the confirmation of a
causal hypothesis, the objectivist attempt to define "cause" or "risk" in
terms of relative frequencies simply does not carve nature at the joints:
too many instances in which a reasonable person would make
paradigmatically rational judgments about risk turn out to be undefined
and meaningless when translated into probabilistic concepts. On the
other hand, in making risk entirely a matter of consistent application of
Bayesian inference rules, given fixed information, the subjectivist
makes it impossible to misjudge risks. If risk is always just what the
decision maker thinks it is, then the concept of risk provides no grounds
for ex post judgments of culpability; but such judgments are the heart
of tort law. We are, therefore, left with the causal answer: risks are real
whenever its admittedly vague conditions would be judged to apply by a
24 Hacklng, supranote 15, at 152-154.
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reasonable person. These conditions require that the evidence available
at the time of choice supports an inference that a proposed action is
causally related to unwanted consequences, or that such causal relations
exist, despite being unknown and even unknowable to the agent. This
is not to say that an agent should be held responsible for unknowable
consequences, only that ignorance of them does not make risk nonexistent. The objectivist view of risk overshoots these rough criteria in
one direction, while the subjectivist view overshoots them in the other.
This philosophical conclusion supports several implications for
policy. It is, at least a further argument against the view that the
assessment stage of risk analysis is a purely objective and value free
domain of scientific enquiry. The dangers of sharply splitting
assessment from acceptance have been noted before,2 5 but this seems
to be a lesson that bears repeating. A more specific policy implication
here is that probabilistic notions of risk are not necessarily better than
causal ones. While I would not want to be construed as rejecting the
relevance of statistical risk studies, I do think that the considerations
discussed above support the view that a reasonable person's concept of
risk, vague as it is, is better suited to the regulatory requirements of
risk management than are probabilistic concepts. As such, any
suggestion that probabilistic concepts of risk should become the basis
of risk management decision practice or of legal decisions regarding risk
is a regressive pursuit of false Gods. Such a shift in our social practices
for the management of risk might serve the political aims of big science
(many of which I support), but not the philosophical commitment to
truth and objectivity.
25 Dreyfus and Dreyfus, Inadequacies in the Decision Analysis Model of
Rationality,in 1 FOUNDATIONS AND APPLICATIONS OF DECISION THEORY 115
(Hooker, Leach and McClennon eds. 1978); Shrader-Frechette, Environmental

Impact Analysis and the Fallacy of UnfinishedBusiness, 4(1) ENVIRONMENTAL
ETHICS 37 (f982); M. SAGOFF, RISK-BENEFIT ANALYSIS IN DECISIONS
CONCERNING PUBLIC SAFETY AND HEALTH (1985).

